Gradualism and Uncertainty in International Union Formation

This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the ‘core’ countries’ interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration.

The erosion of national democratic politics?

The results of the May 6 parliamentary elections have heralded the end of an era in its post-dictatorial democratic politics (metapolitefsi) characterized by alternation in power by two catch-all parties, cartelization of government, and heavy statism. The people have expressed a strong aversion to established political elites of the center-left PASOK and the center-right New Democracy (whose vote shares added up to 32%, less than half of their sum total in the 2009 elections). The rise of SYRIZA, a pre-electoral coalition of left-wing movements, has been the major story so far. However, the existing electoral system – designed by New Democracy in 2006 as a buttress for an entrenched two-party system and stable single-party government – has led to a significant distortion of the democratic will in terms of the translation of vote shares into seats (New Democracy gained more than a third of the seats with only 19% of the vote)

Only a major political compromise from all sides can keep Greece in the euro

Talks are continuing in an attempt to reach a deal between Greece and its creditors over the release of further financial assistance to the country. Nikitas Konstantinidis writes that even if a deal can be reached by the Greek government at the European level, there would remain uncertainty as to whether the coalition government’s majority could survive the parliamentary ratification process. He argues that while it was a politically motivated decision to let Greece into the euro, it will take a sizeable political compromise on many different levels to keep it in

With negotiations reaching an impasse, a more radical approach is needed to solve the Greek debt crisis

In February, Greece agreed to a four month extension of its current bailout programme, subject to the approval of reform measures proposed by the Greek government. As yet, however, the country’s creditors have still not reached an agreement over the reforms which have been put forward. Nikitas Konstantinidis writes that with tough negotiations ahead, the piecemeal approach which has so far been adopted by Eurozone governments during the crisis is becoming increasingly unsustainable

Elections 2012: the Greek political system in flux?

The Greek political system has come under intense scrutiny in the past few years. The two successive electoral contests that took place on May 6 and June 17 opened a Pandora’s box so to say of democratic ailments: extremism, populism, witch-hunting, and fear-mongering. Viewed from the perspective of five successive years of recession, unprecedented levels of austerity, and acute economic uncertainty, this should come as no surprise

Greece’s increasingly polarised and fragmented party system is at odds with the country’s international position.

Last month, the Democratic Left party left Greece’s coalition government, leaving PASOK and New Democracy with a razor-thin majority and the expectation of fresh elections for the country. Nikitas Konstantinidis argues that Greece’s political system has become much more fragmented in the wake of the crisis, with voters also now paying more attention to populist promises than parties’ ability to deliver change. Party competition in Greece has also been further constrained by the intervention of the EU and the Troika into domestic political life, severely limiting policy alternatives

Electoral cycle timing and popular support for a treaty are crucial in determining whether parties advocate referendums on European integration

David Cameron is committed to holding a referendum on the UK’s EU membership should he win a majority at the next general election. In an effort to understand why parties call for referendums on European integration, Andreas Dür and Nikitas Konstantinidis look at data from the ratification of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004. They find that the amount of time until the next election has a significant impact on whether parties choose to support referendums or not, and that parties are far more likely to advocate a referendum on unpopular and controversial issues

Why Greeks voted the way they did in the bailout referendum

The Greek bailout referendum resulted in a clear victory for the ‘No’ side, but what explained the choices made by voters? Ignacio Jurado, Nikitas Konstantinidis and Stefanie Walter present results from a detailed survey conducted in Greece the day before the referendum was held. Among the findings, they note that voting intention was heavily influenced by partisan narratives concerning the likely consequences of the referendum, with a majority of Yes supporters believing a Grexit would occur following a No vote, but only a small percentage of No supporters believing this to be true

Take Back Control? The Effects of Supranational Integration on Party-System Polarization

In this paper, we examine the relationship between supranational integration and domestic party-system polarization (extremism). We first construct a theoretical argument that uncovers the key trade-off between the “output legitimacy” of a supranationally integrated party system and the inevitable loss of “input legitimacy” caused by externally imposed policy constraints. This translates into a strategic tradeoff between responsibility and responsiveness at the party level of electoral competition. We hypothesize that while moderate supranational policy constraints can initially speed-up platform convergence, ever-closer political integration may reverse the trend towards higher levels of party-system polarization and party extremism.We apply our framework to the case of EU integration and test our key non-monotonic prediction both at the party-system level of polarization and at the party level of ideological extremism. Finally, we apply to synthetic control method (SCM) for causal inference in comparative case studies to study how political integration and supranational policy constraints have affected their overall level of party-system polarization over time. Our overall empirical analysis strongly corroborates our theoretical argument

Experts react: Greek referendum

The final result of the Greek referendum saw 61.3 per cent of voters reject the proposal, with 38.7 per cent voting in favour. We asked some of EUROPP’s contributors for their reactions to the result and what it could mean for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. Kyriakos Moumoutzis: “To ‘live life on their own terms’ is to live life outside the Eurozone” Jonathan White: “The wider anti-austerity movement is likely to continue to make itself heard” Lorenzo Codogno: “In the long term, this whole saga may turn out to be positive as it may trigger a much-needed clarification on Eurozone governance and the future of the Union” Nikitas Konstantinidis: “Greece is fast degenerating into a regime of illiberal Chavism and there is not much Europeans can do to stem this tide” Eri Bertsou: “The big question is what Tsipras will choose to do next